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CHAPTER 8 
Insurance Law 
JOHN G. RYAN* 
A. CouRT DECISIONS 
§8.1. Application of causation principles to "exclusion" cases. 
In Standard Electric Supply Co. v. Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insur-
ance Co. 1 the Massachusetts Appeals Court enunciated a rule of causa-
tion for application to situations where an insured's loss is partially a 
result of a peril which is excluded from coverage by the insurance 
policy. The insured plaintiff in Standard Electric had personal property 
stored in a basement where it was damaged as a result of water seep-
age. The water was first discharged by the bursting of a pipe in a 
neighbor's cellar which was approximately eight feet away from and 
three feet higher than plaintiff's basement. The water reached 
plaintiff's property by seepage from the neighbor's cellar through the 
foundation and/or walls of plaintiff's building. 2 
The plaintiff's property was insured "against all risks of physical 
loss" with certain specified exclusions. 3 Among the defendant's policy 
exclusions was a typical water damage exclusion which provided in 
pertinent part: "This policy does not insure against loss caused by, re-
sulting from, contributed to or aggravated by ... water below the 
surface of the ground including that which . . . flows, seeps or leaks 
through ... foundations, walls, basement or other floors .... "4 
Water damage as such was not totally excluded, however, since the 
policy did provide specific coverage for "leakage or accidental dis-
charge from automatic sprinkler systems."5 
The insurance company denied coverage, contending that the ex-
clusion applied regardless of the original source of the water. The 
*JOHN G. RYAN was formerly Commissioner of Insurance for the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts. He is now in private practice in Hingham. 
§8.1. 1 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 123, 307 N.E.2d 11. 
2 Id. at 123-24, 307 N.E.2d at 12. 
3 Id. at 124, 307 N.E.2d at 12. 
4 ld. at 124 n.l, 307 N.E.2d at 12 n.l. 
5 Id. at 126 n.4, 307 N.E.2d at 13 n.4. While this inclusion of coverage for certain 
types of water damage has no apparent connection with the decision in this case, the 
court saw fit to note the fact in its opinion. 
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plaintiff argued that the exclusion was inapplicable because the ulti-
mate cause of the damage to his property was the bursting of the 
neighbor's pipe. The Appeals Court, reversing the court below, 
agreed with the plaintiff. 6 
The general rule in analysis of "all risk" coverage is that recovery 
will "be allowed for all fortuitous loss . . . unless the policy contains a 
specific provision expressly excluding the loss from coverage."7 Ap-
plied literally, the water damage exclusion would seem to bar recovery 
here. The Appeals Court, however, noted "that a distinction should 
be drawn between an excluded event which is a cause and such an 
event which is the inevitable result of another event .... "8 One of 
the myths of insurance law has been that there are basic distinctions 
between the legal causation principles applied in tort law and those 
applied in insurance and other contract cases. 9 As one commentator 
has concluded: 
[T]he analogy between insurance and tort cases on issues of prox-
imate cause is quite close. Where differences appear, they are 
more accurately explained . . . not as manifestations of a general 
tendency of insurance cases in contrast with tort cases but rather 
as consequences of enforcing one kind of contractual provision in 
contrast with another. 10 
Standard Electric presented the case of an excluded peril that is the 
result of an otherwise covered event. The court quite clearly applied 
tort causation principles to avoid giving effect to the exclusion. Cus-
tomary principles of causation would reach back at least to the burst-
ing of the pipe in a search for a legally liable actor. Thus, it would 
appear consistent to regard the water damage as a mere step in a 
longer chain of causation. This is precisely what the Appeals Court 
did when it recognized that the water damage was both a cause and 
"an event which is the inevitable result of another event ... "-the 
bursting of the pipe.U 
While Standard Electric does not break new ground, 12 it is a clarify-
ing decision that offers considerable aid in ascertaining the legal effect 
that should be given to insurance policy exclusion clauses. Moreover, 
the causation principle applied by the court is sound both in law and 
6 Id. at 124, 307 N.E.2d at 12. 
7 13 G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 48:138, at 596 (2d ed. R. Anderson 
1965). 
8 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 126, 307 N.E.2d at 13, quoting Wyatt v. North-
western Mut. Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 781, 783 (D. Minn. 1969). 
9 SeeR. Keeton, Basic Text on Insurance Law§ 5.5(b), at 317-19 (1971). 
10 Id. at 318-19. 
11 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 126, 307 N.E.2d at 13, quoting Wyatt v. North-
western Mut. Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 781, 783 (D. Minn. 1969). 
12 See 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 126, 307 N.E.2d at 13, citing 5 J. Appleman, 
Insurance Law and Practice§ 3083, at 311 (1970); 18 G. Couch, supra note 7, § 74:706, 
at 614-15. 
2
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1974 [1974], Art. 11
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1974/iss1/11
§8.2 INSURANCE LAW 153 
logic. As was long ago stated: "The cause of a cause is the cause of the 
effect."13 Application of this principle to the many disputes that arise 
out of the application of exclusion clauses in insurance policies will 
likely provide a practical and just means by which to resolve such dis-
putes. 
§8.2. Subrogation: Other first party coverages. In Morin v. Mas-
sachusetts Blue Cross, Inc. 1 the Supreme Judicial Court denied subroga-
tion recovery by Massachusetts Blue Cross, Inc. and Massachusetts 
Blue Shield, Inc. against the proceeds of an automobile medical pay-
ments policy due a Blue Cross-Blue Shield subscriber. Plaintiff in 
Morin was injured while riding as a guest passenger in a car insured 
under a standard "Massachusetts Combination Motor Vehicle Policy" 
containing the usual form of "Automobile Medical Payments" cover-
age to a limit of $2,000 per injured person. Plaintiff was also covered 
under a group insurance policy issued by the defendants, Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield. The latter policy contained the following subrogation 
provision: 
"To the extent that benefits for services, supplies, or both are 
provided hereunder, Blue Cross and Blue Shield shall be subro-
gated and succeed to any right of recovery of the Member or 
Subscriber because of such services or supplies against any person 
or organization, except insurers on policies of health insurance covering 
the Member or Subscriber. The Member and the Subscriber shall 
pay over to Blue Cross and Blue Shield all amounts recovered by 
suit, settlement, or otherwise from any third person or his insurer to 
the extent of the benefits provided hereunder .... "2 
After paying approximately $3,500 in hospital and medical charges 
for plaintiff, Blue Cross and Blue Shield claimed $2,000 from the 
medical payment coverage provided by the automobile insurer on the 
strength of the above subrogation provision. The auto insurer drew 
its check payable jointly to plaintiff and Blue Cross-Blue Shield. Plain-
tiff then instituted suit for a determination of rights to the proceeds. 
A superior court finding in favor of Blue Cross-Blue Shield was re-
versed by the Supreme Judicial Court.3 
Dispositive of the Blue Cross-Blue Shield claim that the exception to 
its right of recovery against "insurers on policies of health insurance" 
did not apply to "medical payments" coverage was the Court's find-
ing: 
The words "medical payments" readily call up the idea of 
13 "[C]ausa causae est causa causati." Roswell v. Prior, 88 Eng. Rep. 1570, 1573 (K.B. 
1701). 
§8.2. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 857,311 N.E.2d 914. 
2 Id. at 859, 311 N.E.2d at 915 (emphasis added), quoting group master medical pol-
icy. 
3 Id. at 857-58, 869, 311 N.E.2d at 914-15, 921. 
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"health." An intelligent reader looking at the subrogation provi-
sion and asked whether he thought it applied to medical pay-
ments in the combination policy could be expected to wonder why 
the reason behind the exception for health insurance . . . would 
not embrace the medical payments coverage as well.4 
In reaching that conclusion, the Court described the Combination 
Motor Vehicle policy as a "loose-knit combination" of policies, "one of 
which relates to medical payments."5 It then refused to find substance 
in the Blue Cross-Blue Shield argument that there was a meaningful 
distinction between "health" and "accident" insurance which would 
justify treating the medical payments policy as something other than 
"health insurance." In support of this finding the Court pointed to 
various statutory provisions, judicial decisions and leading texts where 
the terms "health insurance" and "accident insurance" are used in var-
ied and inconsistent ways. 6 
The Court rejected the further contention of Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield that the obligation to pay over amounts recovered "from any 
third person or his insurer" provided a separate ground for recovery 
by the defendants, by noting that the plaintiff was not a third party, 
but rather was a recipient of a direct obligation from the medical 
payments insurer. 7 
The issue raised by the Morin case-whether any subrogation or 
"pay over" provision can extend to direct benefits due to an insured 
from other policies-is likely to become increasingly controversial in 
view of the growing acceptance of "no-fault" auto insurance plans, 
which are essentially enriched medical payments plans. 8 In the instant 
case the Court recognized the issue and suggested that recovery by 
one insurer of proceeds due to an insured from a second insurer 
raised serious questions. 9 While it seems unlikely that health insurers 
will succeed in attempts to use either a subrogation provision or a 
"pay over" clause to recover from no-fault insurers, it should be ob-
served that such problems have been overcome in the health insur-
ance field by the utilization of coordination of benefits provisions. 
The major difficulty that would be presented by a policy provision ex-
cusing payment in whole or in part by a health insurer where a no-
fault auto benefit was available might be a delay in the delivery of 
benefits. In addition, it is not clear under present law that the public 
4 Id. at 865, 311 N.E.2d at 919. 
5 Id. at 863, 311 N.E.2d at 917. 
6 Id. at 863-65 & n.9, 311 N.E.2d at 917-18 & n.9. 
7 Id. at 866-67, 3ll N.E.2d at 919-20. 
8 See Ryan, No-Fault Automobile Insurance, 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§ 22.2-.5, 
at 531-33. 
9 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 868, 3ll N.E.2d at 920-21. The Court added: "[A] court 
. . . would have to hold that one party providing first party insurance benefits would 
be able to recover from another party who stands in the same shoes, without any 
reasonable distinction present to justify the apparent arbitrary result." Id. at 868 n.l5, 
311 N .E.2d at 920 n.l5, quoting Capwell & Greenwald, Legal and Practical Problems 
Arising From Subrogation Clauses in Health and Accident Policies, 54 Marq. L. Rev. 
255, 276 (1971). 
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could be assured that the resulting savings would be reflected in lower 
premium costs since the rates charged for health insurance are gener-
ally not as closely regulated as those for auto insurance. 10 
It is submitted that these difficulties could be substantially di-
minished by excusing the auto insurer from payment where health in-
surance is available. An effort to effectuate such a reform in Mas-
sachusetts was made by the Commissioner of Insurance in legislative 
recommendations in 1973 and 1974,11 While those proposals have 
thus far not received legislative support, it seems likely that the 
enactment of a federal health insurance plan would raise the issue. 
The Morin case, in that context, can stand as an example of the need 
to draw appropriate provisions coordinating the obligations of the var-
ious insurers providing coverage to the policy holder. 
§8.3. Rate regulation. A potentially significant gap in the effec-
tive regulation of workmen's compensation as well as fire and casualty 
rates was closed in the 1974 Survey year by the Supreme Judicial 
Court's affirmance of a disapproval by the Commissioner of Insur-
ance of a workmen's compensation rate increase. Liberty Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance 1 was a challenge by all insurers 
writing workmen's compensation insurance in Massachusetts to a 1973 
decision of the Commissioner disapproving a requested rate increase 
that had been filed by the insurers. 2 At issue was the authority of the 
Commissioner to disapprove a set of rates on the ground that "the al-
lowance for expenses . . . will be excessive for participating stock car-
riers and mutual carriers."3 The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the 
decision of the Commissioner on the narrow ground that he had dis-
cretion to so act under the circumstances and that "[o]n such matters 
[the Court is] not authorized to substitute [its] judgment for that of 
the Commissioner." 4 
The significance of the Court's decision and the regulatory action 
by the Commissioner that provoked the insurers' challenge is the flex-
ibility introduced into the rate approval process for workmen's com-
pensation rates and other forms of insurance rates subject to disap-
proval under the provisions of the fire rate regulatory law5 and the 
casualty rate law. 6 Liberty Mutual raised for judicial interpretation the 
requirement that the rate maker and the regulator give "due consid-
10 The Massachusetts statutes are typical. Auto insurance rates are extensively regu-
lated. E.g., G.L. c. 175, § 113B. Health insurance rates are not as closely regulated and, 
indeed, there is no regulatory control over group rates at all. See G.L. c. 175, §§ 108, 
110. 
11 Mass. H.R. Doc. No. 67 (1974); Mass. H.R. Doc. No. 115 (1973). 
§8.3. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1205, 313 N.E.2d 897. 
2 The filing was made pursuant to G.L. c. 152, § 52. 
3 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1205-06, 313 N.E.2d at 898. "Participating stock carriers" 
are investor owned, stock insurance companies that pay dividends to policyholders. 
4 Id. at 1214-15, 313 N.E.2d at 903. 
5 G.L. c. 174A. 
6 G.L. c. 175A. 
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eration . to dividends." 7 Historically, the insurers had been al-
lowed to use a set of "manual rates" that were based upon the demon-
strated expense needs of insurance companies not paying policyholder 
dividends. 8 Actuarial data disclosed in the Liberty Mutual case showed 
that these expense needs were far greater than those needed to meet 
the operating expenses of insurers paying dividends, primarily be-
cause the dividend paying insurers paid lower commissions to sales 
personnel. 9 The Court noted the Commissioner's finding that as a re-
sult of the historic practice, due consideration to dividends merely 
provided the dividend paying companies with "an allowance . . . for 
fictitious expenses."10 While the Court found the historic method 
permissible, it upheld the Commissioner's departure from the practice 
as a proper exercise of discretion. 11 
Thus, from the Court's decision in Liberty Mutual it would appear 
that some form of direct consideration of dividends is required that 
would presumably mandate some allowance beyond that for losses 
and expenses. The case, therefore, can be read as a partial victory for 
each side. It seems to guarantee to the insurers a consideration of div-
idends in rate making while at the same time affirming the authority 
of the Commissioner to regulate rates in accordance with demon-
strated needs. It is in this latter sense that the decision closes a poten-
tially significant gap in the regulator's authority. 
Each of the major rating laws of Massachusetts contains a require-
ment that due consideration be given to dividends to policyholders. 12 
The Subcommittee of the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners, which drafted and recommended the model rating law upon 
which the present provisions are based, recognized that a gap in regu-
lation was left as a result of their approach to the dividend problem. 
The Subcommittee commented: 
In the preparation of this Act [the model rate law] the sub-
committee was aware of the fact that if an insurance law, as dis-
tinguished from a rating law, did not contain a provision empow-
ering the commissioner to regulate dividends, there was, in effect, 
a gap in the chain of regulation governing rates . . . .13 
Neither the Massachusetts legislature nor those of most other states 
7 G.L. c. 152, § 52C(f)(l). 
8 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1207-10, 313 N.E.2d at 899-900. 
9 Id. at 1208, 313 N.E.2d at 899. Commission and brokerage expenses, as a percen-
tage of net premiums earned in 1971, varied as follows: non-participating stock com-
panies, 9.5%; participating stock companies, 5.2%; mutual companies, 1.8%. Id. 
10 Id. at 1215, 313 N.E.2d at 903. 
11 Id. at 1213-15,313 N.E.2d at 902-03. 
12 G.L. c. 152, § 52C(f); G.L. c. 174A. § 5; G.L. c. 175A, § 5. The rating laws are a 
product of the McCarran Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970), enacted in 1945, which 
suspends the application of federal antitrust laws to the extent the insurance business is 
properly regulated by the individual states. 
13 National Ass'n of Insurance Commissioners, Proceedings 125-26 (1946). 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1974 [1974], Art. 11
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1974/iss1/11
§8.4 INSURANCE LAW 157 
took steps to fill the gap. 14 Consequently, total control over dividends 
has been vested in the management of insurers. Thus, as long as the 
administration of rating laws amounts to mere approval of rates high 
enough to meet the loss and expense needs of the higher cost insur-
ers, those companies with lower expense needs are free to retain or 
distribute excess earnings without regulation. A requirement that each 
insurer demonstrate its own expense needs, 15 supplemented by direct 
consideration of dividends, would offer the public far more assurance 
that the rates being charged are proper. 16 The significance of Liberty 
Mutual is that it arms the regulator with the necessary authority to 
bring about that result. 
§8.4. Blue Cross coverage: Hospital contracts. In Commonwealth 
v. Mercy Hospita[l the Supreme Judicial Court was called upon to in-
terpret a recent statutory provision2 regulating the relationship be-
tween nonprofit hospital service corporations and hospitals in the 
Commonwealth following the expiration of the contract previously de-
fining that relationship. The statute was enacted by the legislature 
when it appeared likely that Massachusetts Blue Cross, Inc., a non-
profit hospital service corporation, and at least some Massachusetts 
hospitals would fail to reach a new agreement defining payments to 
be made on behalf of Blue Cross subscribers. 3 Prior to the legislative 
action, any hospital not under contract with Blue Cross would have 
been a non-participating hospital and, accordingly, Blue Cross would 
have been authorized to reimburse such hospitals for services ren-
dered its subscribers only if the services were related to accident, 
emergency illness or quarantinable disease. 4 Chapter 703 of the Acts 
of 1972 removed this limitation on Blue Cross' payments by providing 
that Blue Cross could either reimburse its subscriber directly or, upon 
a subscriber's written direction, make payment on his behalf to a 
non-participating hospital for services relating to accident, illness or 
maternity. 5 The obvious intent of the legislation was to avoid a crisis 
upon the anticipated failure of Blue Cross and Massachusetts hospitals 
14 See Mass. S. Doc. No. 610, 19-20 (1947); C. A. Williams, Insurance Arrangements 
Under Workmen's Compensation, U.S. Dep't. of Labor, Wage & Labor Standards Ad. 
Bull. No. 317,63, at 107-08 (1969). 
15 The expense needs of an individual insurer may of course vary significantly from 
those of all other insurers of a particular type (stock, mutual, etc.). A proper rating sys-
tem should recognize these variations as well as those by type of insurer. 
16 This is the presumed goal of making rates subject to approval of a state authority. 
§8.4. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 43, 306 N.E.2d 435. 
2 Acts of 1972, c. 703. 
3 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 44, 306 N .E.2d at 437. The contracts defining the relation-
ship between nonprofit hospital service corporations and various hospitals in the Com-
monwealth are formulated pursuant to G.L. c. l76A, § 1. 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 44, 306 N.E.2d at 437. This reimbursement limitation was 
imposed by G.L. c. 176A, § 1, as amended by Acts of 1968, c. 432, § 1. 
5 Acts of 1972, c. 703, which provides: 
Nothing in this chapter shall prevent such a corporation from reimbursing a sub-
scriber for services received in a non-participating hospital within or outside the 
7
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to agree on a new contract. 
The Mercy Hospital case was instituted by the Massachusetts Attor-
ney General who petitioned, on the behalf of the Commonwealth's 
citizenry, for a judicial construction of chapter 703. Specifically, the 
Court was asked to determine whether the statute imposed any obliga-
tions upon hospitals; the amount of reimbursement that Blue Cross 
was required to make to the hospitals if so directed by subscribers; 
and the limits, if any, the statute put upon the hospitals' right to col-
lect additional amounts from Blue Cross subscribers after accepting 
payments from Blue Cross. 6 
Blue Cross intervened in the suit and contended that the statute re-
quired hospitals to accept payments made by Blue Cross as payments 
in full as if a contract existed. The hospitals countered by suggesting 
that the statute did not mandate acceptance of Blue Cross payments 
and, moreover, if the reimbursements were accepted, they were to be 
based on the increased charges current at the time that the services 
were rendered to a particular subscriber. The Court rejected both of 
these arguments. 7 Had either been accepted, the statute's presumed 
role in encouraging negotiations leading to a new contract would have 
been seriously undermined. The Blue Cross position would have pro-
vided its proponent with all the benefits of the expired contract. The 
hospital's argument, in turn, would have stripped Blue Cross of the 
benefit it receives from the agreed reimbursement formula in the cus-
tomary contract. 8 The Court concluded that the statute placed no ob-
ligations upon the hospitals but, if they chose to accept payment from 
Blue Cross, the rates of reimbursement were to be based on the terms 
of the expired contract. 9 
The final question was whether a hospital accepting Blue Cross 
payments had the right to recover additional amounts directly from 
the Blue Cross subscriber on whose behalf the payment had been 
made. 10 The Court noted that chapter 703 required that the "reim-
bursements and payment . . . shall conform with such . . . guarantee 
of benefits as shall bave been in effect pursuant to section five of this 
chapter [ 176A] immediately prior to the expiration of the then most 
commonwealth in the event of accident, illness or maternity or, upon the written 
direction of the subscriber, from making payment to said hospital for such ser-
vices; provided, however, that the amount of such reimbursement and payment to 
any such hospital within the commonwealth shall conform with such method of 
payment and guarantee of benefits as shall have been in effect pursuant to section 
five of this chapter immediately prior to the expiration of the then most recent 
contract between said hospital and said corporation and shall be based upon the 
charges of the hospital in effect on such date. 
6 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 43,46-47, 306 N.E.2d at 436, 438. 
7 Id. at 45-47, 306 N.E.2d at 437-38. 
8 See id. at 47 n.2, 306 N.E.2d at 438 n.2. 
9 Id. at 46-47, 306 N.E.2d at 438. 
10 Id. at 47, 306 N.E.2d at 438. 
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recent contract."11 As the "guarantee of benefits" in section 5 refers to 
the hospitals' obligation to provide services, the Court was faced with 
the dilemma of determining how a payment to a hospital can conform 
with a hospital's contractual duty to provide services. 12 Accepting the 
judicial task of construing "the statute in such a way as to make it an 
effective piece of legislation,"13 the Court construed chapter 703 as 
requiring the hospital to provide the services specified in the Blue 
Cross contract without additional charge to the subscriber. 14 To rule 
otherwise, the Court reasoned, would render the statutory "guarantee 
of benefits . . . a nullity since it would give the subscriber little more 
than he had without it."15 
Thus, the Court in Mercy Hospital succeeded in fulfilling the legisla-
tive intent of removing the statutory limitations16 which would have 
become effective upon the expiration of the contract between Blue 
Cross and the Massachusetts hospitals while, at the same time, pre-
serving the concept of voluntary relations inherent in chapter 176A.17 
§8.5. No-fault insurance. In Chipman v. Massachusetts Bay Trans-
portation Authority 1 the Supreme Judicial Court narrowed the restric-
tion on recovery of damages for pain and suffering prescribed in the 
Commonwealth's no-fault insurance law. 2 Specifically, the Court held 
that where a plaintiff has no recourse to personal injury protection, 
the statute does not bar suit for damages for pain and suffering if the 
defendant is exempted from the no-fault scheme.3 
The case is also of interest from an insurance viewpoint because the 
Court raised in a footnote the possibility that a public carrier has a 
contractual duty to its passengers to provide safe carriage. Expressly 
left unresolved was the question of the constitutional impact of the 
no-fault law upon an action for breach of this contractual duty seek-
ing damages for pain and suffering.4 It would appear the Court was 
inviting this issue for judicial scrutiny. 
11 Id. at 47-48, 306 N.E.2d at 439, quoting Acts of 1972, c. 703. See note 5 supra. 
12 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 48-49, 306 N .E.2d at 439. G.L. c. 176A, § 5 provides in 
part that "[e]very contract made by such corporation [Blue Cross] with a participating 
hospital ... shall contain a provision whereby such hospital . . . guarantees to sub-
scribers ... the benefits of the subscriber's certificate in effect at the time such services 
are ,provided notwithstanding the ability of such corporation [Blue Cross] to pay there-
for. 
13 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 49,306 N.E.2d at 439. 
14 Id. at 49-50, 306 N.E.2d at 439-40. 
15 Id. at 49, 306 N.E.2d at 440. 
16 See text at notes 4-5 supra. 
17 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 50, 306 N.E.2d at 440. The Court's resolution of the am-
biguity concerning G.L. c. 176A, § 5 should not conceal the judicial concern with 
broadly drafted legislation, which often is accorded a significance different from that 
envisioned by legislative draftsmen. 
§8.5. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh.-, 316 N.E.2d 725. 
2 G.L. c. 231, § 6D. 
3 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at-, 316 N.E.2d at 729. For a complete discussion of this case, 
see §6.9 supra. 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at-n.9, 316 N.E.2d at 729 n.9. 
9
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B. LEGISLATION 
§8.6. Underwriting. Increased attention has been given by the 
Massachusetts legislature during the past several years to the difficul-
ties that certain groups of persons have in obtaining insurance. 1 Dur-
ing the 1974 Survey year, four major pieces of legislation altering the 
underwriting freedom of insurers were passed. 2 The Acts reveal that 
the General Court has adopted two different approaches to the per-
ceived problems. One approach is to mandate that every insurance 
policy contain certain prescribed benefits, whereas the other is to pro-
hibit an insurer from refusing coverage on specified grounds. 
In the area of mandated benefits, chapter 1174 of the Acts of 1973 
requires fairly extensive benefits for the treatment of "mental and 
nervous conditions."3 A second piece of legislation mandates automat-
ic coverage for new-born children under health insurance contracts 
covering persons domiciled in the Commonwealth.4 
In regard to prohibitions, newly enacted chapter 374 of the Acts of 
197 4 proscribes refusal of individual life insurance or membership in 
certain fraternal benefit societies "for the sole reason of blindness."5 
Chapter 668 of the Acts of 1974 prohibits refusal or limitation of ac-
cident, sickness, disability, life or endowment coverages "solely be-
cause of the sex of the insured."6 
Certainly the social goals advanced by this legislation are desirable. 
A careful examination of the Acts also discloses that the legislature 
has exercised considerable discretion in selecting the benefits that will 
be mandated, the policies in which they must be contained, and the 
persons to whom they will apply. It appears less certain, however, 
whether any real appreciation of the additional costs imposed upon 
the insuring public preceded legislative action. This concern was high-
lighted by a late 1974 request by Massachusetts Blue Cross for a rate 
increase to cover the mental illness costs. The Blue Cross request was 
accompanied by a public statement designed to make it clear that the 
legislature in mandating new benefits had also mandated increased 
costs. 7 While the trend toward legislative interference with the free-
dom of insurers to exclude certain benefits seems clear, it is not ap-
parent whether future legislative activity will be as discriminating in its 
targets as the activity to date. 
§8.6. 1 See Acts of 1972. c. 804; Wadsworth, Insurance Law, 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law§ 5.13, at 114. 
2 Acts of 1974, cc. 374; 668; 785. Acts of 1973, c. 1174. 
3 Acts of 1973, c. 1174. 
4 Acts of 1974, c. 785. 
5 Acts of 1974, c. 374. 
6 Acts of 1974, c. 668. 
7 Boston Herald American, Oct. 3, 1974, at 3, col. l-3. 
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§8.7 INSURANCE LAW 161 
§8. 7. Rating laws. Chapter 53 of the Acts of 197 4 makes a fun-
damental change in the fire and casualty rating laws by requiring rate 
filings to be made at least fifteen days prior to the intended effective 
date and allowing the Commissioner of Insurance to extend the time 
an additional thirty days. 1 
§8.7. 1 Acts of 1974, c. 53. 
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